Discussion of Patrick Butler\u27s
 Cost-Based Pricing of Individual Automobile Risk
Transfer: Car-Mile Exposure Unit Analysis by Cardoso, Ruy A.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Journal of Actuarial Practice 1993-2006 Finance Department
1993
Discussion of Patrick Butler's "Cost-Based Pricing
of Individual Automobile Risk Transfer: Car-Mile
Exposure Unit Analysis"
Ruy A. Cardoso
Automobile Insurers Bureau
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/joap
Part of the Accounting Commons, Business Administration, Management, and Operations
Commons, Corporate Finance Commons, Finance and Financial Management Commons, Insurance
Commons, and the Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Finance Department at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Actuarial Practice 1993-2006 by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska -
Lincoln.
Cardoso, Ruy A., "Discussion of Patrick Butler's "Cost-Based Pricing of Individual Automobile Risk Transfer: Car-Mile Exposure Unit
Analysis"" (1993). Journal of Actuarial Practice 1993-2006. 173.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/joap/173
JOURNAL OF ACTUARIAL PRACTICE VOL. 1, NO. 11993 
Discussion of Patrick Butler's 
"Cost-Based Pricing of Individual Automobile Risk 
Transfer: Car-Mile Exposure Unit Analysis" 
Ruy A. Cardoso* 
Aside from its hyperacademic title, Patrick Butler's paper on 
mileage and merit rating of automobile insurance policies provides a 
nice twist to an old model and a reasonably compelling theoretical 
argument for the use of mileage as a rating variable. Yet one basic 
real world truth runs counter to Dr. Butler's view: automobile insur-
ance companies generally do not use mileage as a rating variable, 
except in the broadest of categories. This is despite the fact that 
Dorweiler's justification for the use of mileage has been around for 
more than 60 years. 
Because it generally is conceded that classification schemes have 
become more refined over time in response to competition, why 
haven't insurers already gone down the path to which Dr. Butler 
points? I can suppose two reasons: (1) competition doesn't really work; 
or (2) competition does work and the competitive market finds the 
use of mileage to be wanting in some respect. In my opinion, the sec-
ond reason is more likely to be true. 
Assuming this second reason is correct, then either the demand for 
or the supply of mileage rating is too low for it to be used more than 
it is. On the demand side, it is possible that insurance company cus-
tomers don't like the notion of having their odometers inspected or of 
adding an uncertain level of premiums to their already complicated 
lives; after all, the purpose of insurance is to replace uncertain losses 
with certain, not uncertain, premiums. On the supply side, the costs 
of administering a system such as that proposed by Dr. Butler simply 
* Ruy Cardoso, FCA5, MAAA, currently is vice president and chief actuary of the 
Automobile Insurers Bureau of Massachusetts where he represents the Massachusetts 
automobile insurance industry in regulatory hearings concerning insurance rates. Mr. 
Cardoso previously has heId consulting and insurance company positions whose 
primary focus was the analysis of casualty insurance loss reserves. He graduated from 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1983 with an 5.B. in management science. 
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may outweigh the benefits; I am unaware of any administrative cost 
studies that would illuminate the answer to this particular question. 
Beyond pointing out this basic conflict between theory and prac-
tice, I would like to make the following observations on Dr. Butler's 
analysis: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
While there is likely to be at least some correlation between 
variation in mileage and variation in claim frequency within a 
class, the Butler analysis essentially assumes a perfect correla-
tion, disregarding the legion of unmeasurable factors that could 
account for as much variation as does mileage; Dr. Butler's numer-
ical results should be tempered considerably, therefore, before 
being used in the real world; 
Dr. Butler is clearly in the right when he notes that the per mile 
expected risk transfer cost only can be determined if real car-
mnes of exposure are determined. Any study based on mileage 
data reported by either insurers or insureds is subject to question. 
In the former case, this may be due to insurer indifference in 
reporting correct statistical data when no premium effect is 
involved. In the latter case, this may be due to insureds' incen-
tive to cheat. Here in Massachusetts, where I currently am 
employed, we have found that nearly 30% of policies have esti-
mated future annual mileage of zero recorded; on the other hand, 
nearly 50% of policies have estimated future annual mileage of 
magnitudes too high to qualify for any rate discount, making it 
like1y that these estimates are unaffected by cheating; 
Again, here in Massachusetts, we have found some evidence of a 
relationship between annual mileage estimates (which are based 
on questionable data, as explained above) and merit rating classi-
fication under the merit rating scheme used here; in particular, 
the higher rated (worse) drivers do tend to have higher mileage 
estimates, in keeping with Dr. Butler's thesis; and 
Finally, Dr. Butler's point (in his section 11) that "Applying a 
recent claim surcharge to the cents-per-mile class price, however, 
would constitute a deliberate, random, and unjustifiable increase" 
seems to argue for the complete elimination of merit rating, 
which the paper does not justify. As anyone who has listened to 
a radio talk show can attest, at least some part of the driving 
public demands merit rating as a way of punishing those per-
ceived as offenders (unless, of course, the caner is one of those on 
the receiving end of a surcharge, in which case he or she would 
look on Dr. Butler's article quite favorably). Talk show callers 
aside, the potential relationship between merit rating classifica-
tion and other unmeasured vanables (aside from mileage) cannot 
be dismissed based solely on this article, nor can the virtually-
impossible-to-measure deterrence effects of a merit rating scheme. 
In summary, Dr. Butler's article, while not quite supportive of all 
of his conclusions, does make plain the problem of random incidence. 
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The principle that "cars driven more than class-average miles are 
over represented in the accident sample" is one that I expect many 
practicing actuaries frequently forget. I recall an analogous phe-
nomenon from an undergraduate probability class; if one surveys sub-
way riders at random and asks how many days per month they ride 
the subway, the average answer will be too high an estimate of the 
population mean because the survey-taker more likely will encounter 
persons who are frequently on the subway. Of course, if we all rode 
the subway every day, the incidence problem would go away, as 
would much of the need for cars and the corresponding mileage and 
merit rating issues. If Dr. Butler is not starting his own insurance 
company soon, perhaps he can devote some time to the advocacy of 
better public transportation systems, thereby reducing the problem he 
has illustrated so nicely. 
Richard G. WolI* 
Ruy A. Cardoso 
Auto Insurers Bureau of MA 
Seventh Floor 
101 Arch Street 
Boston, MA 02110 
The purpose of this paper, according to Patrick Butler, is to 
"demonstrate that the car-mile exposure unit is essential to cost-
based pricing of individual risk transfer." On the basis of his demon-
stration, Dr. Butler advocates changing the exposure basis for private 
passenger automobile insurance from a car-year basis to a per mile 
basis. Current auto insurance prices are based on a contract that runs 
for a fixed period of time, usually a half year. He argues that the 
basis for the insurance contract for most coverages should be changed 
to miles driven. 
Dr. Butler's demonstration consists of creating a simplified model 
where there are three types of insurance customers. The first type: of 
customer drives 5,000 miles per year. The second drives 10,000 miles 
per year, and the third drives 20,000 miles per year. He assumes 
that the risk process for each customer is Poisson with a frequency of 
* Richard G. Woll is research actuary for the Allstate Research and Planning Center 
at Menlo Park, California. He is a Fellow of the Casualty Actuarial Society, a 
member of the American Academy of Actuaries and a member of the Risk Theory 
Seminar of the American Risk and Insurance Association (ARIA). His work in 
connection with the implementation of a new auto classification plan in California 
included analysis of insurance results by miles driven. 
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one accident per 100,000 miles. For illustrative purposes, he assumes 
that each claim costs $10,000. He then uses this information to gen-
erate the dollars of loss experienced by each customer. This allows 
him to evaluate the effect of what he calls claim record pricing. This 
means establishing prices on the basis of prior claim records. He con-
cludes that claim record pricing does not match prices to costs as well 
as charging on the basis of miles driven. He also concludes from this 
that "the car-mile exposure unit is essential to cost-based pricing of 
individual risk transfer." 
Insurance companies currently recognize differences in miles 
driven by the use of class factors. Or. Butler argues, however, that: 
Modern class plans continue to show very narrow distributions 
of cars by base price multiplier in contrast to the range in the 
miles driven (Butler, Butler, and Williams, 1988). 
Basing insurance prices on the number of miles driven makes intuitive 
sense. It is obvious that the difference in rates between two drivers, 
other things being equal, should be proportional to the difference in 
the miles they drive. The cost of insuring different auto customers, 
however, depends not only on how much they drive, but on other fac-
tors such as how well they drive, where they drive, and what kind of 
car they drive. 
In addition, the relationship between the number of miles a cus-
tomers drives and insurance claims is complex. Or. Butler seems to 
assume that customers who drive more than other customers have 
proportionately more losses. That is, he expects a customer who 
drives 10,000 miles to have twice the losses of a customer who drives 
5,000 miles. Allstate's data, however, present a more complicated 
picture. Figure 1 shows the relationship between the number of POl 
claims per mile and the number of miles driven annually by a cus'-
tomer. It uses information about the 1991 PO claim experience of 
Allstate customers in California.2 
Figure 1 shows the number of PO claims per mile going from 3.5 
claims per 100,000 miles for persons who drive about 1,000 miles per 
year down to 0.3 claims per 100,000 miles for persons driving 30,000 
miles or more. This is in sharp contrast to the constant number of 
1 PD (property damage liability) claim frequency is used because it generally has been 
found to be the best indicator of underlying accident frequency. 
2 Because of the passage of Proposition 103 in California which mandated the use of 
mileage in rating automobile policies, Allstate sent questionnaires to all its customers 
to get mileage data. Allstate already had collected mileage information on its 
customers, but the questionnaire helped to confirm the information. 
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claims per 100,000 miles assumed in Dr. Butler's analysis. This results 
in customers who drive about 1,000 miles per year having a claim 
frequency of 3.5 claims per year per 100 insured cars while those who 
drive over 30,000 miles have a claim frequency of about 8.0-a rela-
tionship of 2.25 to one, rather than the 30+ to one under Dr. Butler's 
assumptions. 
When we turn our attention to other risk factors, we find that 
mileage is a relatively unimportant source of difference between cus-
tomers compared to territory and years of driving experience. 
Figure 1 
PO Claims per Mile by Annual Mileage 
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The effectiveness of any auto insurance risk assessment system 
depends on the extent to which it matches insurance prices to insur-
ance costs. Dr. Butler has demonstrated that the use of mileage as an 
exposure base in a theoretical world, where all differences in loss 
experience come from differences in the number of miles driven, is 
more effective than the use of claim record pricing. He has not 
demonstrated anything with respect to actual insurance experience. 
The effectiveness of automobile insurance risk assessments systems 
was discussed extensively many years ago. A study by the Stanford 
Research Institute (SRI) in 1976 entitled The Role of Risk 
Classifications in Property and Casualty Insurance: A Study of the Risk 
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Assessment Process developed a means for evaluating risk assessment 
systems by measuring the variance of expected losses of the partitions 
each system produces.3 
The most efficient risk assessment system is the one that divides 
insurance customers into groups ,with the largest variance in expected 
losses. We also can evaluate the relative importance of various risk 
classification factors by measuring the percentage of the total vari-
ance each factor explains. 
Dr. Butler seems to argue that the primary contributor to the 
variance of expected losses in the real world is the difference in the 
number of miles that each customer drives. There is no evidence pre-
sented by Dr. Butler, or by anyone else, to show that this is the case. 
The major case made for mileage in the paper is the repeated obser-
vation that insurance risk is transferred, mile after mile, by driving. 
Using the SRI approach, the Allstate Research and Planning 
Center recently conducted a study of risk classification factors in 
California. The study covered most of the factors customarily used by 
most companies with the exception of vehicle characteristics. 
Allstate has collected data on the mileage driven by each customer 
since 1981, so the study was able to include mileage. Mileage, years 
licensed, and territory explained over 90 percent of the variance of 
the classification data included in the study for liability coverages 
(bodily injury liability, property damage liability, medical pay-
ments, and uninsured motorists). Over 55 percent of the total vari-
ance, however, was explained by territorial differences. Years 
licensed explained almost 23 percent of the variance, and mileage 
explained about 14 percent. 
The picture was somewhat different for collision coverage. 
Territory, mileage, and years licensed again explained over 90 per-
cent of the variance, but mileage explained over 33 percent of the 
total variance, years licensed explained about 30 percent, and terri-
tory explained about 26 percent. 
3 The SRI report states "First, we define a measure of efficiency. Our probabilistic 
model for actual losses separates the random element of actual losses from the 
predictable element, the expected loss, that is, claim likelihood and expected claim 
severity. A perfectly efficient risk assessment process would be one that estimates 
exactly individuals' expected losses. A process with zero efficiency would not resolve 
any of the initial expected loss uncertainty. A process with intermediate efficiency 
will be characterized by the average fraction of the initial expected loss uncertainty It 
resolves" (emphasis added). 
The report continues that: "We find it convenient to use variance to measure 
uncertainty because of [its) additive property ... In words, the expected loss variance in 
an entire population is equal to the sum of the average expected loss variance within 
each class and of the variance of the rates (average expected losses) among classes" 
(SRI, Supplement, p. 200). 
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Insurance customers with less than one year of experience have 
the highest losses per car. Losses per car decline each subsequent 
year. Thus, persons with more years of driving experience have 
improved loss experience. This, in turn, suggests that an important 
element in the transfer of insurance risk is how the customer drives. 
Territory rates, of course, depend on where insurance customers drive. 
The Allstate study indicates clearly that how much its customers 
drive is only part of the overall variance of systematic risk. It is 
more important than the other two factors for collision insurance, but 
still accounts for only about one third of the total variance. It plays 
even a smaller role in liability insurance, the major part of auto 
insurance costs. 
Thus, we do not believe that Dr. Butler has been able "to demon-
strate that the car-mile exposure unit is essential to cost-based pric-
ing of individual risk transfer." 
Author's Reply to Discussion 
Richard G. Wall 
Allstate Insurance Co. 
Allstate R & P Center 
321 Middlefield Road 
Menlo Park CA 94025-9765 
The discussions by Messrs. Ruy A. Cardoso and Richard G. Woll 
question different points in the paper and raise other important 
issues concerning automobile insurance exposure units that are outside 
the immediate scope of the paper. Responding to these questions not 
only calls for expanded consideration of points discussed in the paper, 
but also requires examination of further consequences of conversion to 
the car-mile exposure unit and of retaining the car-year unit. The 
efforts of Mr. Cardoso and Mr. Woll in providing this opportunity 
and challenge are appreciated greatly. 
Reply to Discussion By Ruy A. Cardoso 
Mr. Cardoso's major argument against conversion to the car-mile 
exposure unit can be paraphrased as follows: if the car-mile were 
judged superior to the car-year by Dorweiler in 1929 and has not been 
adopted or even studied since then (over 60 years), then the car-mile 
unit must have some unidentified fatal flaw. Specific flaws suggested 
by Mr. Cardoso are (1) the technical failure of future mileage as a 
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classification variable, (2) the irrelevancy of exposure measurement 
because competition prevents overpricing, and (3) customer resistance 
to odometer auditing. Upon examining these suggested flaws, how-
ever, one finds evidence that the true fatal flaw that has prevented 
the use of the car-mile unit is seen only from the perspective of auto-
mobile insurers. Adoption of the car-mile unit as an objective stan-
dard for measuring transfer of on-the-road risk would curtail price 
competition severely for larger-premium consumers with broad insur-
ance needs. It also would end the subsidy for this competition cur-
rently paid by consumers transferring less than class average risk per 
car-year. 
Mr. Cardoso's criticism of mileage as a flawed classification 
variable-Le., usable only in broadest categories, insurer indifference 
to integrity of data, incentive to cheat-agrees with company rate 
hearing testimony previously published; see Butler, Butler, and 
Williams (1988, p. 388). The problem with this critique is that it 
misses the point: the subject discussed by the current paper, as well as 
by the 1929 Dorweiler study, is not classification variables but exposure 
units. It is necessary, therefore, to clarify the difference between 
variables chosen to define price classes and the price unit chosen as 
the unit of purchase to which prices refer. 
Gasoline purchase provides a ready analogy to distinguish classi-
fication variables from the price unit. Gasoline usually is available 
in twelve different price classes. The pricing variables that distin-
guish these classes are three octane levels, self service or full service, 
and cash or credit payment; thus, 3 x 2 x 2 = 12 prices. Yet the gaso-
line gallon is the unit of purchase common to all of the price classes. 
In auto insurance, price classes are defined by variables such as terri-
tory, driver characteristics, and use of car. Distinct from such class 
definition variables is the price unit; currently the car-year, but 
which would be the car-mile after conversion to the car-mile exposure 
unit. Although classification variables and the price unit have dis-
tinct functions, the choices of which to use for assessing the cost of 
risk transfer are influenced strongly by auto insurance price competi-
tion. 
In suggesting that competition currently prevents insurance over-
pricing of cars driven less than average, Mr. Cardoso apparently is 
taking the well-known fact that competition lowers auto insurance 
prices for marketing targets and extrapolating it to the public rela-
tions dictum that competition precludes overpricing. There is plenti-
ful evidence, however, that insurers' price competition for customers 
with more risk to insure has, as its complementary effect, the over-
pricing of customers with less risk to insure (what Bailey (1960) calls 
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"skimming the cream"). This effect was described in 1911 by the 
New York State Legislature's Merritt Committee Report (p. 41) in its 
examination of the need for regulation of fire insurance pricing: 
In a state of open competition the rates adjust themselves not 
to the hazards but largely to the strength of the insured so 
that the man of influence, whose patronage is desired, will 
get his insurance too cheaply, as against the small man who 
is not in a position to drive a sharp bargain. That is, compe-
tition results in discrimination. 
Automobile rate hearing records contain admissions that costs are 
shifted from higher mileage customers to lower mileage customers 
and from men to women in response to price competition; see Butler, 
Butler, and Williams (1988, p. 405). For example, in 1982 State Farm 
testified to the Pennsylvania Insurance Department that in order to 
keep the price down for its higher mileage customers, the company 
keeps its low mileage discount to about half the size it should be. 
State Farm stated: 
We're already very competitive on the [lower mileage] class, 
and we're generally tight on a competitive standpoint on [the 
higher mileage] class, and if we widen the differential, 
we're going to hurt ourselves very substantially on the 
[higher mileage] class of business. 
Later in the hearing the State Farm actuary explained: 
We like to follow the statistics where we can. The rating 
law talks about rates which are not excessive, inadequate or 
unfairly discriminatory, but your rating [law] also talks about 
doing nothing to prohibit competition in the marketplace, 
and as a matter of fact, we simpfy can't-we just can't always 
follow the statistical indications. 
Auto insurers not only keep price differences between risk classes 
smaller than cost differences to compete for members of the more 
costly class, but also merge higher and lower risk classes or do not 
divide classes where such groups are distinguishable. In the latter 
case, for example, competition for adult men's business explains why 
nearly all cars in the adult driver classes are unisex-rated despite 
government mileage statistics, backed by accident involvement data, 
that show that men's average risk per year is about twice women's 
average risk per year. The same accident involvement data are said 
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to require sex-divided prices for youth classes. Rate-hearing testi-
mony also shows that men's prices may be lowered contrary to expe-
rienced cost to allow agents to establish good relations with young 
men who are desirable as future sales targets. 
Just as competition works to flatten rather than sharpen class dif-
ferences, resistance to any real measure of exposure differences within 
classes also expresses competitive concern for the "man of influence" 
at the expense of the "small man." The capacity for miles of driving 
is dependent on income level, which generally determines the ability 
to buy gasoline and own reliable cars. Because the car-year price unit 
is the status quo for insurance, the result of choosing this price unit as 
opposed to one that responds to individual cost can be examined by 
analogous conversion of the price unit for gasoline from the gallon to 
the car-year. That is, what would the consequences be for customers if 
gasoline were sold like auto insurance? 
With gasoline sold by the car-year, everybody with cars in the 
same class would pay a dollars per car-year price based on the cost 
per car of supplying gasoline for that class in previous years and 
adjusted for expected change in gasoline cost and, as currently done 
for auto insurance, any trend toward increased or decreased driving. 
Payment in advance for a car-year's worth of gasoline would allow 
customers to draw gasoline as needed from the class pool. Sale of 
gasoline by the car-year, however, would lead to problems analogous 
to the affordability breakdown that occurs in areas where the car-
year price of auto insurance is high. 
With gasoline prices set to cover the anticipated car-year aver-
age cost of each class, above average users of gasoline would experi-
ence a decrease in their gasoline expense paid by an increase in gaso-
line expense for below average users. Once accustomed to the benefits 
of unmetered gasoline, the above average user would object to any 
expense and accountability that using meters on gasoline pumps would 
entail, as Mr. Cardoso observed would occur with the use of odome-
ters to earn insurance premiums. If the increase in annual gasoline cost 
per car were to force some below average users to give up cars, how-
ever, class average gallons per car-year would rise. A rise in average 
consumption would raise the cost of gasoline per car-year and would 
force still more below average users to give up their cars, causing the 
gasoline cost per car-year to rise even more. This death spiral effect 
that results when prices are not tied to a unit of individual consump-
tion first would become apparent where the annual prices are high-
est, as is happening currently with auto insurance in some urban 
areas. 
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Surcharging the yearly gasoline bill of every tenth customer in a 
class so that the other nine can receive a customer retention discount 
would be analogous to the randomness of auto insurance merit rating. 
(Although Mr. Cardoso defends merit rating as having possible deter-
rence effects, customer retention is an obvious purpose. If discounts for 
claim free years were really risk-related, eligibility would transfer 
between companies. Customers generally are puzzled to discover that 
it does not.) With gasoline sold by the gallon instead of the car-year, 
however, the classification variables that set prices are certain, 
objective, obviously related to a cost that can be evaluated by cus-
tomers, and not easily manipulated to price discriminate between cus-
tomers. From the auto insurers' viewpoint, the real fatal flaw in car-
mile pricing is that it would inhibit cost shifting within classes by 
making the cost of individual risk transfer as understandable and 
controllable as the gasoline cost of automobile operation. 
The public demand for driver-record pricing voiced on call-in 
radio talk shows to which Mr. Cardoso refers is a political response 
based on the only information available to consumers. Charged by 
the car-year, auto insurance is experienced as a flat tax on car owner-
ship at prices based on group characteristics. By appearing to take 
the individual into account, driver-record pricing competes, as the 
paper notes, with the idea of making the car-mile the price unit for 
individual risk transfer. 
Reply to Discussion By Richard G. Woll 
Two sentences early in Mr. Woll's discussion transform what pur-
ports to be a critique of the paper's subject-the car-mile as the price 
unit for individual risk transfer-into a critique of a topic that the 
paper does not address-the problematic estimated future mileage 
discount classes with the car-year as the price unit. (These discounts 
are used by some insurers, but were rejected as inherently unenforce-
able by other insurers after several decades' use; see Butler, Butler, 
and Williams (1988, p. 388». "It is obvious," Mr. Woll states, "that 
the difference in rates between any two drivers, other things being 
equal, should be proportional to the difference in the miles they 
drive. The cost of insuring different auto customers, however, depends 
not only on how much they drive but on other factors such as how well 
they drive, where they drive, and what kind of car they drive." 
While the qualifying phrase "other things being equal" in the 
first sentence could refer to the purpose of classifications such as 
those cited in the second sentence, the word "however" in the second 
sentence suggests a rebuttal of the first. Together they seem to imply 
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that the amount driven is not a measurement but a factor, i.e. a clas-
sification variable arguably related to risk, as are driver experience, 
garaging territory, and car type. For the remainder of the discussion, 
Mr. Woll criticizes the car-mile exposure unit as if it were a mileage 
classification variable (which it is not) to be compared with other 
car-year classification variables as has been done in his research at 
Allstate. 
The basic premise of the paper is that the car-mile must work in 
conjunction with risk classification as the exposure unit to measure 
the cost of individual risk transfer. The abstract states that odometer 
miles multiply "a cents-per-mile rate based on class experience" and 
that the "per mile cost of individual risk transfer is a class prop-
erty." The essential relationship of individual exposure measurement 
to risk classification is emphasized in every section. It is from this 
perspective that the main issues raised by Mr. Woll will be 
addressed. These issues are within-class proportionality of cost to 
miles driven; observed decreasing claim rates per mile with increas-
ing annual mileage; and car-mile costs by territory classification. 
The question of proportionality of cost to miles driven is raised 
by Mr. Woll's observation that Dr. Butler "expects a customer who 
drives 10,000 miles to have twice the losses of a customer who drives 
5,000 miles." This correctly represents how the car-mile unit works if 
the cars driven different distances are classified identically (and 
have the same coverage). 
The proportionality assumed by the current car-year system, 
ostensibly for administrative convenience, is that within-class cost is 
proportional to the time period the car is insured in units of car-
years. This assumption produces widely divergent per mile costs for 
cars identically classified. Table 1 illustrates this using Mr. Woll's 
5,000 and 10,000 miles per car-year example. The cars driven the two 
distances per year are garaged in the same territory and are classi-
fied identically by driver (adult unisex) and use (pleasure with lim-
ited commuting to work). The premium and per mile costs of 10,000 
miles of coverage driven at 5,000 miles per car-year under two 
arrangements are compared with the cost of driving 10,000 miles in 
one car-year. Three different premiums are paid for 10,000 car-miles 
of exposure. 
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TABLE 1 
Within-Class Variation in Cost of 10,000 Miles Coverage 
Territorial Discount- Premium Cost per 
Base Adjusted Paid for Mile 
How 10,000 Miles Price per Class 10,000 for 
are Driven Car-Year' Discount" Multiplier Car-Miles Owner 
1 Car in 2 Years $500 Mileage 1.00 $1000 10.0t 
2 Cars in 1 Year $500 Mileage 0.85 $850 B.5t 
Multicar 
1 Car in 1 Year $500 None 1.15 $575 5.Bt 
, Assumed value 
" Deductions from the class multiplier: -0.15 for estimated future mileage less than 7500 miles; 
-0.15 for two or more cars on policy. From the Pennsylvania manual of State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance, effective 5/15/92 
Table 1 shows that factors not directly related to risk, such as 
number of cars in a household and how intensively they are used 
within time periods, determine large differences in what is charged 
per mile of exposure to risk of loss for cars in the same territory and 
driver risk class. 
The requirement endorsed by Mr. Woll that the number of price 
units should be proportional to expected losses, other risk factors 
being equal, leads to the absurd conclusion that insurers currently 
expect a customer who drives 10,000 miles over two years or in two 
cars in one year to have approximately twice the losses as a customer 
driving one car the same distance in one year. 
Mr. Woll raises the issue of decreasing claims per mile with 
increasing annual mileage by presenting Allstate study data in his 
Figure 1. By raising this relationship as an objection to the car-mile 
as a price unit, Mr. Woll implies that the same cents-per-mile price 
would be applied to all cars and therefore would overcharge the 
owners of cars driven more intensively in a year relative to owners of 
cars driven much less in a year. This objection, however, ignores the 
fact that cents-per-mile prices would depend on each car's risk classi-
fication. 
As in prior studies with similar results, the results shown in Mr. 
Woll's Figure 1 are obtained with data that either are unclassified 
or are classified only by driver sex; see Butler, Butler, and Williams 
(1988, p. 266). As a consequence, drivers at the extremes of the age 
range, who have considerably higher than average accident rates per 
mile and also average much less driving, would be over represented 
at lower mileages without classification by driver age. (The paper 
points out that car-miles of exposure randomly sampled by accidents 
would be biased toward the cars of such driver groups.) Concurrently, 
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the higher mileage data would be biased to cars used predominantly 
on limited access highways with lower accident rates per mile. As 
Mr. Woll points out, it is not just miles driven that determine risk 
transfer cost, but territory, driver, and use of car, all of which require 
risk classification for evaluation. Conversion of class prices from dol-
lars-per-year to cents-per-mile demonstrates this essential relation-
ship. 
Table 2 compares the conversions of two existing car-use classes to 
cents-per-mile prices. All that is necessary for the conversion is an 
average mileage value for the class. At averages assumed for the two 
classes, the difference in the cents-per-mile class prices shown in the 
table approximate the threefold decrease in per mile claim rates 
with the fivefold increase in intensity of car use from 5,000 miles to 
25,000 miles per year shown by the Allstate data in Mr. Woll's 
Figure 1. 
TABLE 2 
Car-Mile Prices For Two Use Classes 
Territory Car- Average Calculated 
Car-Year Year Miles per Price per 
Class Base Price* Multiplier** Price Car-Year* Car-Mile 
Pleasure $500 .95 $475 5,000 9.5t 
Business $500 1.40 $700 25,000 2.8t 
* Assumed values 
** Adult unisex driver class. Multipliers from the California manual of State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance, effective 1/15/91 
What determines per-mile risk for a car is not the number of 
miles it is driven within an arbitrary time period (one year), but the 
average conditions under which the driving is done. Although inten-
sity of car use may correlate with driver age and car use, classifica-
tion is essential to determine the cost of insurance coverage per car-
mile for any set of driving conditions. The car-mile unit for measuring 
the cost of risk transfer is also essential to meaningful territorial 
classifica tion. 
As though the car-mile were a classification variable, Mr. Woll 
states that "[W]e find that mileage is a relativel} unimportant 
source of difference between customers compared to territory." An 
example shows, however, that classification by territory depends on 
the car-mile exposure unit-as distinct from mileage classification-
to have meaning for individual risk transfer. Table 3 shows the 
dollars per car-year prices for a high priced territory and a low 
priced territory in California for cars in the same driver and use 
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class. The ratio of high to low prices per car-year is 4.4, presumably 
representing the greater traffic density in Los Angeles and other 
differences in conditions and costs. The cents-per-mile costs for car 
owners also is shown in both territories at three mileage amounts. 
TABLE 3 
Car-Mile Costs by Territory and Miles Driven 
Car-Year 
Price for Car-Mile Cost to Owner by 
California High Annual Miles Car is Driven in Year 
Territory Mileage* 3,000** 12,000 20,000 
13 Northern Counties $265 7.6ft 2.U 1.3ft 
Los Angeles City $1172 33.7ft 9.8ft 5.9ft 
* State Farm manual effective 1-15-91. Minimum coverage, adult unisex driver and car use pro-
file from California Insurance Dept.'s 1990 Auto Premium Survey 
** Discount for estimated future mileage less than 7,500 miles applied 
If it is assumed that the average exposure for the class in both 
territories in Table 3 is 12,000 miles per car-year, conversion to the 
car-mile unit means that all of the northern counties cars would be 
paying 2.2 cents a mile and all of the Los Angeles cars in the class 
would be paying nearly 10 cents a mile, thus preserving the differ-
ence in territorial risk transfer costs. 
In contrast to the differences between territories in cents-per-mile 
costs at class average mileages, the northern counties owners of cars 
driven 3,000 miles in a year pay more than seven cents a mile while 
owners of Los Angeles cars driven 20,000 miles in a year pay less than 
six cents a mile. The meaning of difference in risk by territory is lost 
if more is paid per mile for individual cars in territories with low 
traffic densities than is paid per mile for individual cars in territo-
ries with the highest traffic densities. 
Mr. Woll devotes a considerable portion of his critique to dis-
cussing his study of statistical measures for comparing classifications 
of car-year data, citing evaluation methods developed by the 
Stanford Research Institute (SRI). Although the SRI study (1976) did 
not evaluate the car-mile unit as an alternative to the car-year unit, 
a major finding from its empirical study of nine years of individual 
driver accident records establishes strong limitations on the ability 
of classification by year to distinguish the cost of individual driving 
risk. The study corroborates that the most powerful class separation 
is driver sex, with men's average accident likelihood per year about 
twice the women's average. Despite this large class difference, how-
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ever, the distributions of individual accident likelihoods per year for 
men and women completely overlapped, with 13% of women having 
likelihoods greater than men's average and 28% of men having like-
lihoods less than women's average. These overlapping distributions 
and averages show characteristics that are similar to the distribu-
tions of men's and women's annual mileages in relation to the approx-
imately 2:1 difference in their average miles driven. Eleven percent 
of women exceed men's average mileage, and 24% of men drive less 
than women's average mileage; see Butler, Butler, and Williams 
(1988, p. 396). Individual miles of driving cannot be predicted from 
experienced class averages, by driver sex, or in any other way. (See 
the paper for the characteristics of individual mileage listed by 
Bailey and Simon.) The miles that individual cars are driven, how-
ever, are recorded on their odometers as the measure of individual 
risk transferred. The expected cents-per-mile cost of risk transfer 
depends on statistically reliable actual class experience. 
Mr. Woll's discussion of the car-mile price unit as if it were a 
classification variable has provided an opportunity to show why the 
car-mile exposure unit is essential to meaningful classification for 
individual risk transfer. Dollars-per-year prices for example risk 
classes that purport to distinguish differences in risk by territory, 
driver, and car use show large individual variability in cents-per-car-
mile costs for reasons not directly related to risk. Therefore, not only 
is the car-mile exposure unit essential for cost-based pricing of indi-
vidual risk transfer, but its use is essential in order for risk classifi-
cation variables (factors) to have meaning for individual risk. 
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